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In the previous set of notes we established the central limit theorem, which we formulate here as follows:
Theorem 1 (Central limit theorem) Let
be iid copies of a real random variable
of mean
and variance
, and write
. Then, for any fixed
, we have
This is however not the end of the matter; there are many variants, refinements, and generalisations of the central limit theorem, and the purpose of this set of notes is to present a small sample of these variants.
First of all, the above theorem does not quantify the rate of convergence in (1). We have already addressed this issue to some extent with the Berry-Esséen theorem, which roughly speaking gives a convergence rate of uniformly in
if we assume that
has finite third moment. However there are still some quantitative versions of (1) which are not addressed by the Berry-Esséen theorem. For instance one may be interested in bounding the large deviation probabilities
in the setting where grows with
. Chebyshev’s inequality gives an upper bound of
for this quantity, but one can often do much better than this in practice. For instance, the central limit theorem (1) suggests that this probability should be bounded by something like
; however, this theorem only kicks in when
is very large compared with
. For instance, if one uses the Berry-Esséen theorem, one would need
as large as
or so to reach the desired bound of
, even under the assumption of finite third moment. Basically, the issue is that convergence-in-distribution results, such as the central limit theorem, only really control the typical behaviour of statistics in
; they are much less effective at controlling the very rare outlier events in which the statistic strays far from its typical behaviour. Fortunately, there are large deviation inequalities (or concentration of measure inequalities) that do provide exponential type bounds for quantities such as (2), which are valid for both small and large values of
. A basic example of this is the Chernoff bound that made an appearance in Exercise 47 of Notes 4; here we give some further basic inequalities of this type, including versions of the Bennett and Hoeffding inequalities.
In the other direction, we can also look at the fine scale behaviour of the sums by trying to control probabilities such as
where is now bounded (but
can grow with
). The central limit theorem predicts that this quantity should be roughly
, but even if one is able to invoke the Berry-Esséen theorem, one cannot quite see this main term because it is dominated by the error term
in Berry-Esséen. There is good reason for this: if for instance
takes integer values, then
also takes integer values, and
can vanish when
is less than
and
is slightly larger than an integer. However, this turns out to essentially be the only obstruction; if
does not lie in a lattice such as
, then we can establish a local limit theorem controlling (3), and when
does take values in a lattice like
, there is a discrete local limit theorem that controls probabilities such as
. Both of these limit theorems will be proven by the Fourier-analytic method used in the previous set of notes.
We also discuss other limit theorems in which the limiting distribution is something other than the normal distribution. Perhaps the most common example of these theorems is the Poisson limit theorems, in which one sums a large number of indicator variables (or approximate indicator variables), each of which is rarely non-zero, but which collectively add up to a random variable of medium-sized mean. In this case, it turns out that the limiting distribution should be a Poisson random variable; this again is an easy application of the Fourier method. Finally, we briefly discuss limit theorems for other stable laws than the normal distribution, which are suitable for summing random variables of infinite variance, such as the Cauchy distribution.
Finally, we mention a very important class of generalisations to the CLT (and to the variants of the CLT discussed in this post), in which the hypothesis of joint independence between the variables is relaxed, for instance one could assume only that the
form a martingale. Many (though not all) of the proofs of the CLT extend to these more general settings, and this turns out to be important for many applications in which one does not expect joint independence. However, we will not discuss these generalisations in this course, as they are better suited for subsequent courses in this series when the theory of martingales, conditional expectation, and related tools are developed.
Let be iid copies of an absolutely integrable real scalar random variable
, and form the partial sums
. As we saw in the last set of notes, the law of large numbers ensures that the empirical averages
converge (both in probability and almost surely) to a deterministic limit, namely the mean
of the reference variable
. Furthermore, under some additional moment hypotheses on the underlying variable
, we can obtain square root cancellation for the fluctuation
of the empirical average from the mean. To simplify the calculations, let us first restrict to the case
of mean zero and variance one, thus
and
Then, as computed in previous notes, the normalised fluctuation also has mean zero and variance one:
This and Chebyshev’s inequality already indicates that the “typical” size of is
, thus for instance
goes to zero in probability for any
that goes to infinity as
. If we also have a finite fourth moment
, then the calculations of the previous notes also give a fourth moment estimate
From this and the Paley-Zygmund inequality (Exercise 44 of Notes 1) we also get some lower bound for of the form
for some absolute constant and for
sufficiently large; this indicates in particular that
does not converge in any reasonable sense to something finite for any
that goes to infinity.
The question remains as to what happens to the ratio itself, without multiplying or dividing by any factor
. A first guess would be that these ratios converge in probability or almost surely, but this is unfortunately not the case:
Proposition 1 Let
be iid copies of an absolutely integrable real scalar random variable
with mean zero, variance one, and finite fourth moment, and write
. Then the random variables
do not converge in probability or almost surely to any limit, and neither does any subsequence of these random variables.
Proof: Suppose for contradiction that some sequence converged in probability or almost surely to a limit
. By passing to a further subsequence we may assume that the convergence is in the almost sure sense. Since all of the
have mean zero, variance one, and bounded fourth moment, Theorem 25 of Notes 1 implies that the limit
also has mean zero and variance one. On the other hand,
is a tail random variable and is thus almost surely constant by the Kolmogorov zero-one law from Notes 3. Since constants have variance zero, we obtain the required contradiction.
Nevertheless there is an important limit for the ratio , which requires one to replace the notions of convergence in probability or almost sure convergence by the weaker concept of convergence in distribution.
Definition 2 (Vague convergence and convergence in distribution) Let
be a locally compact Hausdorff topological space with the Borel
-algebra. A sequence of finite measures
on
is said to converge vaguely to another finite measure
if one has
as
for all continuous compactly supported functions
. (Vague convergence is also known as weak convergence, although strictly speaking the terminology weak-* convergence would be more accurate.) A sequence of random variables
taking values in
is said to converge in distribution (or converge weakly or converge in law) to another random variable
if the distributions
converge vaguely to the distribution
, or equivalently if
as
for all continuous compactly supported functions
.
One could in principle try to extend this definition beyond the locally compact Hausdorff setting, but certain pathologies can occur when doing so (e.g. failure of the Riesz representation theorem), and we will never need to consider vague convergence in spaces that are not locally compact Hausdorff, so we restrict to this setting for simplicity.
Note that the notion of convergence in distribution depends only on the distribution of the random variables involved. One consequence of this is that convergence in distribution does not produce unique limits: if converges in distribution to
, and
has the same distribution as
, then
also converges in distribution to
. However, limits are unique up to equivalence in distribution (this is a consequence of the Riesz representation theorem, discussed for instance in this blog post). As a consequence of the insensitivity of convergence in distribution to equivalence in distribution, we may also legitimately talk about convergence of distribution of a sequence of random variables
to another random variable
even when all the random variables
and
involved are being modeled by different probability spaces (e.g. each
is modeled by
, and
is modeled by
, with no coupling presumed between these spaces). This is in contrast to the stronger notions of convergence in probability or almost sure convergence, which require all the random variables to be modeled by a common probability space. Also, by an abuse of notation, we can say that a sequence
of random variables converges in distribution to a probability measure
, when
converges vaguely to
. Thus we can talk about a sequence of random variables converging in distribution to a uniform distribution, a gaussian distribution, etc..
From the dominated convergence theorem (available for both convergence in probability and almost sure convergence) we see that convergence in probability or almost sure convergence implies convergence in distribution. The converse is not true, due to the insensitivity of convergence in distribution to equivalence in distribution; for instance, if are iid copies of a non-deterministic scalar random variable
, then the
trivially converge in distribution to
, but will not converge in probability or almost surely (as one can see from the zero-one law). However, there are some partial converses that relate convergence in distribution to convergence in probability; see Exercise 10 below.
Remark 3 The notion of convergence in distribution is somewhat similar to the notion of convergence in the sense of distributions that arises in distribution theory (discussed for instance in this previous blog post), however strictly speaking the two notions of convergence are distinct and should not be confused with each other, despite the very similar names.
The notion of convergence in distribution simplifies in the case of real scalar random variables:
Proposition 4 Let
be a sequence of scalar random variables, and let
be another scalar random variable. Then the following are equivalent:
- (i)
converges in distribution to
.
- (ii)
converges to
for each continuity point
of
(i.e. for all real numbers
at which
is continuous). Here
is the cumulative distribution function of
.
Proof: First suppose that converges in distribution to
, and
is continuous at
. For any
, one can find a
such that
for every . One can also find an
larger than
such that
and
. Thus
and
Let be a continuous function supported on
that equals
on
. Then by the above discussion we have
and hence
for large enough . In particular
A similar argument, replacing with a continuous function supported on
that equals
on
gives
for large enough. Putting the two estimates together gives
for large enough; sending
, we obtain the claim.
Conversely, suppose that converges to
at every continuity point
of
. Let
be a continuous compactly supported function, then it is uniformly continuous. As
is monotone increasing, it can only have countably many points of discontinuity. From these two facts one can find, for any
, a simple function
for some
that are points of continuity of
, and real numbers
, such that
for all
. Thus
Similarly for replaced by
. Subtracting and taking limit superior, we conclude that
and on sending , we obtain that
converges in distribution to
as claimed.
The restriction to continuity points of is necessary. Consider for instance the deterministic random variables
, then
converges almost surely (and hence in distribution) to
, but
does not converge to
.
Example 5 For any natural number
, let
be a discrete random variable drawn uniformly from the finite set
, and let
be the continuous random variable drawn uniformly from
. Then
converges in distribution to
. Thus we see that a continuous random variable can emerge as the limit of discrete random variables.
Example 6 For any natural number
, let
be a continuous random variable drawn uniformly from
, then
converges in distribution to the deterministic real number
. Thus we see that discrete (or even deterministic) random variables can emerge as the limit of continuous random variables.
Exercise 7 (Portmanteau theorem) Show that the properties (i) and (ii) in Proposition 4 are also equivalent to the following three statements:
- (iii) One has
for all closed sets
.
- (iv) One has
for all open sets
.
- (v) For any Borel set
whose topological boundary
is such that
, one has
.
(Note: to prove this theorem, you may wish to invoke Urysohn’s lemma. To deduce (iii) from (i), you may wish to start with the case of compact
.)
We can now state the famous central limit theorem:
Theorem 8 (Central limit theorem) Let
be iid copies of a scalar random variable
of finite mean
and finite non-zero variance
. Let
. Then the random variables
converges in distribution to a random variable with the standard normal distribution
(that is to say, a random variable with probability density function
). Thus, by abuse of notation
In the normalised case
when
has mean zero and unit variance, this simplifies to
Using Proposition 4 (and the fact that the cumulative distribution function associated to is continuous, the central limit theorem is equivalent to asserting that
as for any
, or equivalently that
Informally, one can think of the central limit theorem as asserting that approximately behaves like it has distribution
for large
, where
is the normal distribution with mean
and variance
, that is to say the distribution with probability density function
. The integrals
can be written in terms of the error function
as
.
The central limit theorem is a basic example of the universality phenomenon in probability – many statistics involving a large system of many independent (or weakly dependent) variables (such as the normalised sums ) end up having a universal asymptotic limit (in this case, the normal distribution), regardless of the precise makeup of the underlying random variable
that comprised that system. Indeed, the universality of the normal distribution is such that it arises in many other contexts than the fluctuation of iid random variables; the central limit theorem is merely the first place in probability theory where it makes a prominent appearance.
We will give several proofs of the central limit theorem in these notes; each of these proofs has their advantages and disadvantages, and can each extend to prove many further results beyond the central limit theorem. We first give Lindeberg’s proof of the central limit theorem, based on exchanging (or swapping) each component of the sum
in turn. This proof gives an accessible explanation as to why there should be a universal limit for the central limit theorem; one then computes directly with gaussians to verify that it is the normal distribution which is the universal limit. Our second proof is the most popular one taught in probability texts, namely the Fourier-analytic proof based around the concept of the characteristic function
of a real random variable
. Thanks to the powerful identities and other results of Fourier analysis, this gives a quite short and direct proof of the central limit theorem, although the arguments may seem rather magical to readers who are not already familiar with Fourier methods. Finally, we give a proof based on the moment method, in the spirit of the arguments in the previous notes; this argument is more combinatorial, but is straightforward and is particularly robust, in particular being well equipped to handle some dependencies between components; we will illustrate this by proving the Erdos-Kac law in number theory by this method. Some further discussion of the central limit theorem (including some further proofs, such as one based on Stein’s method) can be found in this blog post. Some further variants of the central limit theorem, such as local limit theorems, stable laws, and large deviation inequalities, will be discussed in the next (and final) set of notes.
The following exercise illustrates the power of the central limit theorem, by establishing combinatorial estimates which would otherwise require the use of Stirling’s formula to establish.
Exercise 9 (De Moivre-Laplace theorem) Let
be a Bernoulli random variable, taking values in
with
, thus
has mean
and variance
. Let
be iid copies of
, and write
.
- (i) Show that
takes values in
with
. (This is an example of a binomial distribution.)
- (ii) Assume Stirling’s formula
where
is a function of
that goes to zero as
. (A proof of this formula may be found in this previous blog post.) Using this formula, and without using the central limit theorem, show that
as
for any fixed real numbers
.
The above special case of the central limit theorem was first established by de Moivre and Laplace.
We close this section with some basic facts about convergence of distribution that will be useful in the sequel.
Exercise 10 Let
,
be sequences of real random variables, and let
be further real random variables.
- (i) If
is deterministic, show that
converges in distribution to
if and only if
converges in probability to
.
- (ii) Suppose that
is independent of
for each
, and
independent of
. Show that
converges in distribution to
if and only if
converges in distribution to
and
converges in distribution to
. (The shortest way to prove this is by invoking the Stone-Weierstrass theorem, but one can also proceed by proving some version of Proposition 4.) What happens if the independence hypothesis is dropped?
- (iii) If
converges in distribution to
, show that for every
there exists
such that
for all sufficiently large
. (That is to say,
is a tight sequence of random variables.)
- (iv) Show that
converges in distribution to
if and only if, after extending the probability space model if necessary, one can find copies
and
of
and
respectively such that
converges almost surely to
. (Hint: use the Skorohod representation, Exercise 29 of Notes 0.)
- (v) If
converges in distribution to
, and
is continuous, show that
converges in distribution to
. Generalise this claim to the case when
takes values in an arbitrary locally compact Hausdorff space.
- (vi) (Slutsky’s theorem) If
converges in distribution to
, and
converges in probability to a deterministic limit
, show that
converges in distribution to
, and
converges in distribution to
. (Hint: either use (iv), or else use (iii) to control some error terms.) This statement combines particularly well with (i). What happens if
is not assumed to be deterministic?
- (vii) (Fatou lemma) If
is continuous, and
converges in distribution to
, show that
.
- (viii) (Bounded convergence) If
is continuous and bounded, and
converges in distribution to
, show that
.
- (ix) (Dominated convergence) If
converges in distribution to
, and there is an absolutely integrable
such that
almost surely for all
, show that
.
For future reference we also mention (but will not prove) Prokhorov’s theorem that gives a partial converse to part (iii) of the above exercise:
Theorem 11 (Prokhorov’s theorem) Let
be a sequence of real random variables which is tight (that is, for every
there exists
such that
for all sufficiently large
). Then there exists a subsequence
which converges in distribution to some random variable
(which may possibly be modeled by a different probability space model than the
.)
The proof of this theorem relies on the Riesz representation theorem, and is beyond the scope of this course; but see for instance Exercise 29 of this previous blog post. (See also the closely related Helly selection theorem, covered in Exercise 30 of the same post.)
One of the major activities in probability theory is studying the various statistics that can be produced from a complex system with many components. One of the simplest possible systems one can consider is a finite sequence or an infinite sequence
of jointly independent scalar random variables, with the case when the
are also identically distributed (i.e. the
are iid) being a model case of particular interest. (In some cases one may consider a triangular array
of scalar random variables, rather than a finite or infinite sequence.) There are many statistics of such sequences that one can study, but one of the most basic such statistics are the partial sums
The first fundamental result about these sums is the law of large numbers (or LLN for short), which comes in two formulations, weak (WLLN) and strong (SLLN). To state these laws, we first must define the notion of convergence in probability.
Definition 1 Let
be a sequence of random variables taking values in a separable metric space
(e.g. the
could be scalar random variables, taking values in
or
), and let
be another random variable taking values in
. We say that
converges in probability to
if, for every radius
, one has
as
. Thus, if
are scalar, we have
converging to
in probability if
as
for any given
.
The measure-theoretic analogue of convergence in probability is convergence in measure.
It is instructive to compare the notion of convergence in probability with almost sure convergence. it is easy to see that converges almost surely to
if and only if, for every radius
, one has
as
; thus, roughly speaking, convergence in probability is good for controlling how a single random variable
is close to its putative limiting value
, while almost sure convergence is good for controlling how the entire tail
of a sequence of random variables is close to its putative limit
.
We have the following easy relationships between convergence in probability and almost sure convergence:
Exercise 2 Let
be a sequence of scalar random variables, and let
be another scalar random variable.
- (i) If
almost surely, show that
in probability. Give a counterexample to show that the converse does not necessarily hold.
- (ii) Suppose that
for all
. Show that
almost surely. Give a counterexample to show that the converse does not necessarily hold.
- (iii) If
in probability, show that there is a subsequence
of the
such that
almost surely.
- (iv) If
are absolutely integrable and
as
, show that
in probability. Give a counterexample to show that the converse does not necessarily hold.
- (v) (Urysohn subsequence principle) Suppose that every subsequence
of
has a further subsequence
that converges to
in probability. Show that
also converges to
in probability.
- (vi) Does the Urysohn subsequence principle still hold if “in probability” is replaced with “almost surely” throughout?
- (vii) If
converges in probability to
, and
or
is continuous, show that
converges in probability to
. More generally, if for each
,
is a sequence of scalar random variables that converge in probability to
, and
or
is continuous, show that
converges in probability to
. (Thus, for instance, if
and
converge in probability to
and
respectively, then
and
converge in probability to
and
respectively.
- (viii) (Fatou’s lemma for convergence in probability) If
are non-negative and converge in probability to
, show that
.
- (ix) (Dominated convergence in probability) If
converge in probability to
, and one almost surely has
for all
and some absolutely integrable
, show that
converges to
.
Exercise 3 Let
be a sequence of scalar random variables converging in probability to another random variable
.
- (i) Suppose that there is a random variable
which is independent of
for each individual
. Show that
is also independent of
.
- (ii) Suppose that the
are jointly independent. Show that
is almost surely constant (i.e. there is a deterministic scalar
such that
almost surely).
We can now state the weak and strong law of large numbers, in the model case of iid random variables.
Theorem 4 (Law of large numbers, model case) Let
be an iid sequence of copies of an absolutely integrable random variable
(thus the
are independent and all have the same distribution as
). Write
, and for each natural number
, let
denote the random variable
.
- (i) (Weak law of large numbers) The random variables
converge in probability to
.
- (ii) (Strong law of large numbers) The random variables
converge almost surely to
.
Informally: if are iid with mean
, then
for
large. Clearly the strong law of large numbers implies the weak law, but the weak law is easier to prove (and has somewhat better quantitative estimates). There are several variants of the law of large numbers, for instance when one drops the hypothesis of identical distribution, or when the random variable
is not absolutely integrable, or if one seeks more quantitative bounds on the rate of convergence; we will discuss some of these variants below the fold.
It is instructive to compare the law of large numbers with what one can obtain from the Kolmogorov zero-one law, discussed in Notes 2. Observe that if the are real-valued, then the limit superior
and
are tail random variables in the sense that they are not affected if one changes finitely many of the
; in particular, events such as
are tail events for any
. From this and the zero-one law we see that there must exist deterministic quantities
such that
and
almost surely. The strong law of large numbers can then be viewed as the assertion that
when
is absolutely integrable. On the other hand, the zero-one law argument does not require absolute integrability (and one can replace the denominator
by other functions of
that go to infinity as
).
The law of large numbers asserts, roughly speaking, that the theoretical expectation of a random variable
can be approximated by taking a large number of independent samples
of
and then forming the empirical mean
. This ability to approximate the theoretical statistics of a probability distribution through empirical data is one of the basic starting points for mathematical statistics, though this is not the focus of the course here. The tendency of statistics such as
to cluster closely around their mean value
is the simplest instance of the concentration of measure phenomenon, which is of tremendous significance not only within probability, but also in applications of probability to disciplines such as statistics, theoretical computer science, combinatorics, random matrix theory and high dimensional geometry. We will not discuss these topics much in this course, but see this previous blog post for some further discussion.
There are several ways to prove the law of large numbers (in both forms). One basic strategy is to use the moment method – controlling statistics such as by computing moments such as the mean
, variance
, or higher moments such as
for
. The joint independence of the
make such moments fairly easy to compute, requiring only some elementary combinatorics. A direct application of the moment method typically requires one to make a finite moment assumption such as
, but as we shall see, one can reduce fairly easily to this case by a truncation argument.
For the strong law of large numbers, one can also use methods relating to the theory of martingales, such as stopping time arguments and maximal inequalities; we present some classical arguments of Kolmogorov in this regard.
In the previous set of notes, we constructed the measure-theoretic notion of the Lebesgue integral, and used this to set up the probabilistic notion of expectation on a rigorous footing. In this set of notes, we will similarly construct the measure-theoretic concept of a product measure (restricting to the case of probability measures to avoid unnecessary techncialities), and use this to set up the probabilistic notion of independence on a rigorous footing. (To quote Durrett: “measure theory ends and probability theory begins with the definition of independence.”) We will be able to take virtually any collection of random variables (or probability distributions) and couple them together to be independent via the product measure construction, though for infinite products there is the slight technicality (a requirement of the Kolmogorov extension theorem) that the random variables need to range in standard Borel spaces. This is not the only way to couple together such random variables, but it is the simplest and the easiest to compute with in practice, as we shall see in the next few sets of notes.
In Notes 0, we introduced the notion of a measure space , which includes as a special case the notion of a probability space. By selecting one such probability space
as a sample space, one obtains a model for random events and random variables, with random events
being modeled by measurable sets
in
, and random variables
taking values in a measurable space
being modeled by measurable functions
. We then defined some basic operations on these random events and variables:
- Given events
, we defined the conjunction
, the disjunction
, and the complement
. For countable families
of events, we similarly defined
and
. We also defined the empty event
and the sure event
, and what it meant for two events to be equal.
- Given random variables
in ranges
respectively, and a measurable function
, we defined the random variable
in range
. (As the special case
of this, every deterministic element
of
was also a random variable taking values in
.) Given a relation
, we similarly defined the event
. Conversely, given an event
, we defined the indicator random variable
. Finally, we defined what it meant for two random variables to be equal.
- Given an event
, we defined its probability
.
These operations obey various axioms; for instance, the boolean operations on events obey the axioms of a Boolean algebra, and the probabilility function obeys the Kolmogorov axioms. However, we will not focus on the axiomatic approach to probability theory here, instead basing the foundations of probability theory on the sample space models as discussed in Notes 0. (But see this previous post for a treatment of one such axiomatic approach.)
It turns out that almost all of the other operations on random events and variables we need can be constructed in terms of the above basic operations. In particular, this allows one to safely extend the sample space in probability theory whenever needed, provided one uses an extension that respects the above basic operations; this is an important operation when one needs to add new sources of randomness to an existing system of events and random variables, or to couple together two separate such systems into a joint system that extends both of the original systems. We gave a simple example of such an extension in the previous notes, but now we give a more formal definition:
Definition 1 Suppose that we are using a probability space
as the model for a collection of events and random variables. An extension of this probability space is a probability space
, together with a measurable map
(sometimes called the factor map) which is probability-preserving in the sense that
for all
. (Caution: this does not imply that
for all
– why not?)
An event
which is modeled by a measurable subset
in the sample space
, will be modeled by the measurable set
in the extended sample space
. Similarly, a random variable
taking values in some range
that is modeled by a measurable function
in
, will be modeled instead by the measurable function
in
. We also allow the extension
to model additional events and random variables that were not modeled by the original sample space
(indeed, this is one of the main reasons why we perform extensions in probability in the first place).
Thus, for instance, the sample space in Example 3 of the previous post is an extension of the sample space
in that example, with the factor map
given by the first coordinate projection
. One can verify that all of the basic operations on events and random variables listed above are unaffected by the above extension (with one caveat, see remark below). For instance, the conjunction
of two events can be defined via the original model
by the formula
or via the extension via the formula
The two definitions are consistent with each other, thanks to the obvious set-theoretic identity
Similarly, the assumption (1) is precisely what is needed to ensure that the probability of an event remains unchanged when one replaces a sample space model with an extension. We leave the verification of preservation of the other basic operations described above under extension as exercises to the reader.
Remark 2 There is one minor exception to this general rule if we do not impose the additional requirement that the factor map
is surjective. Namely, for non-surjective
, it can become possible that two events
are unequal in the original sample space model, but become equal in the extension (and similarly for random variables), although the converse never happens (events that are equal in the original sample space always remain equal in the extension). For instance, let
be the discrete probability space
with
and
, and let
be the discrete probability space
with
, and non-surjective factor map
defined by
. Then the event modeled by
in
is distinct from the empty event when viewed in
, but becomes equal to that event when viewed in
. Thus we see that extending the sample space by a non-surjective factor map can identify previously distinct events together (though of course, being probability preserving, this can only happen if those two events were already almost surely equal anyway). This turns out to be fairly harmless though; while it is nice to know if two given events are equal, or if they differ by a non-null event, it is almost never useful to know that two events are unequal if they are already almost surely equal. Alternatively, one can add the additional requirement of surjectivity in the definition of an extension, which is also a fairly harmless constraint to impose (this is what I chose to do in this previous set of notes).
Roughly speaking, one can define probability theory as the study of those properties of random events and random variables that are model-independent in the sense that they are preserved by extensions. For instance, the cardinality of the model
of an event
is not a concept within the scope of probability theory, as it is not preserved by extensions: continuing Example 3 from Notes 0, the event
that a die roll
is even is modeled by a set
of cardinality
in the original sample space model
, but by a set
of cardinality
in the extension. Thus it does not make sense in the context of probability theory to refer to the “cardinality of an event
“.
On the other hand, the supremum of a collection of random variables
in the extended real line
is a valid probabilistic concept. This can be seen by manually verifying that this operation is preserved under extension of the sample space, but one can also see this by defining the supremum in terms of existing basic operations. Indeed, note from Exercise 24 of Notes 0 that a random variable
in the extended real line is completely specified by the threshold events
for
; in particular, two such random variables
are equal if and only if the events
and
are surely equal for all
. From the identity
we thus see that one can completely specify in terms of
using only the basic operations provided in the above list (and in particular using the countable conjunction
.) Of course, the same considerations hold if one replaces supremum, by infimum, limit superior, limit inferior, or (if it exists) the limit.
In this set of notes, we will define some further important operations on scalar random variables, in particular the expectation of these variables. In the sample space models, expectation corresponds to the notion of integration on a measure space. As we will need to use both expectation and integration in this course, we will thus begin by quickly reviewing the basics of integration on a measure space, although we will then translate the key results of this theory into probabilistic language.
As the finer details of the Lebesgue integral construction are not the core focus of this probability course, some of the details of this construction will be left to exercises. See also Chapter 1 of Durrett, or these previous blog notes, for a more detailed treatment.
Starting this week, I will be teaching an introductory graduate course (Math 275A) on probability theory here at UCLA. While I find myself using probabilistic methods routinely nowadays in my research (for instance, the probabilistic concept of Shannon entropy played a crucial role in my recent paper on the Chowla and Elliott conjectures, and random multiplicative functions similarly played a central role in the paper on the Erdos discrepancy problem), this will actually be the first time I will be teaching a course on probability itself (although I did give a course on random matrix theory some years ago that presumed familiarity with graduate-level probability theory). As such, I will be relying primarily on an existing textbook, in this case Durrett’s Probability: Theory and Examples. I still need to prepare lecture notes, though, and so I thought I would continue my practice of putting my notes online, although in this particular case they will be less detailed or complete than with other courses, as they will mostly be focusing on those topics that are not already comprehensively covered in the text of Durrett. Below the fold are my first such set of notes, concerning the classical measure-theoretic foundations of probability. (I wrote on these foundations also in this previous blog post, but in that post I already assumed that the reader was familiar with measure theory and basic probability, whereas in this course not every student will have a strong background in these areas.)
Note: as this set of notes is primarily concerned with foundational issues, it will contain a large number of pedantic (and nearly trivial) formalities and philosophical points. We dwell on these technicalities in this set of notes primarily so that they are out of the way in later notes, when we work with the actual mathematics of probability, rather than on the supporting foundations of that mathematics. In particular, the excessively formal and philosophical language in this set of notes will not be replicated in later notes.
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