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Many structures in mathematics are incomplete in one or more ways. For instance, the field of rationals ${{\bf Q}}$ or the reals ${{\bf R}}$ are algebraically incomplete, because there are some non-trivial algebraic equations (such as ${x^2=2}$ in the case of the rationals, or ${x^2=-1}$ in the case of the reals) which could potentially have solutions (because they do not imply a necessarily false statement, such as ${1=0}$, just using the laws of algebra), but do not actually have solutions in the specified field.

Similarly, the rationals ${{\bf Q}}$, when viewed now as a metric space rather than as a field, are also metrically incomplete, beause there exist sequences in the rationals (e.g. the decimal approximations ${3, 3.1, 3.14, 3.141, \ldots}$ of the irrational number ${\pi}$) which could potentially converge to a limit (because they form a Cauchy sequence), but do not actually converge in the specified metric space.

A third type of incompleteness is that of logical incompleteness, which applies now to formal theories rather than to fields or metric spaces. For instance, Zermelo-Frankel-Choice (ZFC) set theory is logically incomplete, because there exist statements (such as the consistency of ZFC) which could potentially be provable by the theory (because it does not lead to a contradiction, or at least so we believe, just from the axioms and deductive rules of the theory), but is not actually provable in this theory.

A fourth type of incompleteness, which is slightly less well known than the above three, is what I will call elementary incompleteness (and which model theorists call the failure of the countable saturation property). It applies to any structure that is describable by a first-order language, such as a field, a metric space, or a universe of sets. For instance, in the language of ordered real fields, the real line ${{\bf R}}$ is elementarily incomplete, because there exists a sequence of statements (such as the statements ${0 < x < 1/n}$ for natural numbers ${n=1,2,\ldots}$) in this language which are potentially simultaneously satisfiable (in the sense that any finite number of these statements can be satisfied by some real number ${x}$) but are not actually simultaneously satisfiable in this theory.

In each of these cases, though, it is possible to start with an incomplete structure and complete it to a much larger structure to eliminate the incompleteness. For instance, starting with an arbitrary field ${k}$, one can take its algebraic completion (or algebraic closure) ${\overline{k}}$; for instance, ${{\bf C} = \overline{{\bf R}}}$ can be viewed as the algebraic completion of ${{\bf R}}$. This field is usually significantly larger than the original field ${k}$, but contains ${k}$ as a subfield, and every element of ${\overline{k}}$ can be described as the solution to some polynomial equation with coefficients in ${k}$. Furthermore, ${\overline{k}}$ is now algebraically complete (or algebraically closed): every polynomial equation in ${\overline{k}}$ which is potentially satisfiable (in the sense that it does not lead to a contradiction such as ${1=0}$ from the laws of algebra), is actually satisfiable in ${\overline{k}}$.

Similarly, starting with an arbitrary metric space ${X}$, one can take its metric completion ${\overline{X}}$; for instance, ${{\bf R} = \overline{{\bf Q}}}$ can be viewed as the metric completion of ${{\bf Q}}$. Again, the completion ${\overline{X}}$ is usually much larger than the original metric space ${X}$, but contains ${X}$ as a subspace, and every element of ${\overline{X}}$ can be described as the limit of some Cauchy sequence in ${X}$. Furthermore, ${\overline{X}}$ is now a complete metric space: every sequence in ${\overline{X}}$ which is potentially convergent (in the sense of being a Cauchy sequence), is now actually convegent in ${\overline{X}}$.

In a similar vein, we have the Gödel completeness theorem, which implies (among other things) that for any consistent first-order theory ${T}$ for a first-order language ${L}$, there exists at least one completion ${\overline{T}}$ of that theory ${T}$, which is a consistent theory in which every sentence in ${L}$ which is potentially true in ${\overline{T}}$ (because it does not lead to a contradiction in ${\overline{T}}$) is actually true in ${\overline{T}}$. Indeed, the completeness theorem provides at least one model (or structure) ${{\mathfrak U}}$ of the consistent theory ${T}$, and then the completion ${\overline{T} = \hbox{Th}({\mathfrak U})}$ can be formed by interpreting every sentence in ${L}$ using ${{\mathfrak U}}$ to determine its truth value. Note, in contrast to the previous two examples, that the completion is usually not unique in any way; a theory ${T}$ can have multiple inequivalent models ${{\mathfrak U}}$, giving rise to distinct completions of the same theory.

Finally, if one starts with an arbitrary structure ${{\mathfrak U}}$, one can form an elementary completion ${{}^* {\mathfrak U}}$ of it, which is a significantly larger structure which contains ${{\mathfrak U}}$ as a substructure, and such that every element of ${{}^* {\mathfrak U}}$ is an elementary limit of a sequence of elements in ${{\mathfrak U}}$ (I will define this term shortly). Furthermore, ${{}^* {\mathfrak U}}$ is elementarily complete; any sequence of statements that are potentially simultaneously satisfiable in ${{}^* {\mathfrak U}}$ (in the sense that any finite number of statements in this collection are simultaneously satisfiable), will actually be simultaneously satisfiable. As we shall see, one can form such an elementary completion by taking an ultrapower of the original structure ${{\mathfrak U}}$. If ${{\mathfrak U}}$ is the standard universe of all the standard objects one considers in mathematics, then its elementary completion ${{}^* {\mathfrak U}}$ is known as the nonstandard universe, and is the setting for nonstandard analysis.

As mentioned earlier, completion tends to make a space much larger and more complicated. If one algebraically completes a finite field, for instance, one necessarily obtains an infinite field as a consequence. If one metrically completes a countable metric space with no isolated points, such as ${{\bf Q}}$, then one necessarily obtains an uncountable metric space (thanks to the Baire category theorem). If one takes a logical completion of a consistent first-order theory that can model true arithmetic, then this completion is no longer describable by a recursively enumerable schema of axioms, thanks to Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. And if one takes the elementary completion of a countable structure, such as the integers ${{\bf Z}}$, then the resulting completion ${{}^* {\bf Z}}$ will necessarily be uncountable.

However, there are substantial benefits to working in the completed structure which can make it well worth the massive increase in size. For instance, by working in the algebraic completion of a field, one gains access to the full power of algebraic geometry. By working in the metric completion of a metric space, one gains access to powerful tools of real analysis, such as the Baire category theorem, the Heine-Borel theorem, and (in the case of Euclidean completions) the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem. By working in a logically and elementarily completed theory (aka a saturated model) of a first-order theory, one gains access to the branch of model theory known as definability theory, which allows one to analyse the structure of definable sets in much the same way that algebraic geometry allows one to analyse the structure of algebraic sets. Finally, when working in an elementary completion of a structure, one gains a sequential compactness property, analogous to the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem, which can be interpreted as the foundation for much of nonstandard analysis, as well as providing a unifying framework to describe various correspondence principles between finitary and infinitary mathematics.

In this post, I wish to expand upon these above points with regard to elementary completion, and to present nonstandard analysis as a completion of standard analysis in much the same way as, say, complex algebra is a completion of real algebra, or real metric geometry is a completion of rational metric geometry.

(Linear) Fourier analysis can be viewed as a tool to study an arbitrary function ${f}$ on (say) the integers ${{\bf Z}}$, by looking at how such a function correlates with linear phases such as ${n \mapsto e(\xi n)}$, where ${e(x) := e^{2\pi i x}}$ is the fundamental character, and ${\xi \in {\bf R}}$ is a frequency. These correlations control a number of expressions relating to ${f}$, such as the expected behaviour of ${f}$ on arithmetic progressions ${n, n+r, n+2r}$ of length three.

In this course we will be studying higher-order correlations, such as the correlation of ${f}$ with quadratic phases such as ${n \mapsto e(\xi n^2)}$, as these will control the expected behaviour of ${f}$ on more complex patterns, such as arithmetic progressions ${n, n+r, n+2r, n+3r}$ of length four. In order to do this, we must first understand the behaviour of exponential sums such as

$\displaystyle \sum_{n=1}^N e( \alpha n^2 ).$

Such sums are closely related to the distribution of expressions such as ${\alpha n^2 \hbox{ mod } 1}$ in the unit circle ${{\bf T} := {\bf R}/{\bf Z}}$, as ${n}$ varies from ${1}$ to ${N}$. More generally, one is interested in the distribution of polynomials ${P: {\bf Z}^d \rightarrow {\bf T}}$ of one or more variables taking values in a torus ${{\bf T}}$; for instance, one might be interested in the distribution of the quadruplet ${(\alpha n^2, \alpha (n+r)^2, \alpha(n+2r)^2, \alpha(n+3r)^2)}$ as ${n,r}$ both vary from ${1}$ to ${N}$. Roughly speaking, once we understand these types of distributions, then the general machinery of quadratic Fourier analysis will then allow us to understand the distribution of the quadruplet ${(f(n), f(n+r), f(n+2r), f(n+3r))}$ for more general classes of functions ${f}$; this can lead for instance to an understanding of the distribution of arithmetic progressions of length ${4}$ in the primes, if ${f}$ is somehow related to the primes.

More generally, to find arithmetic progressions such as ${n,n+r,n+2r,n+3r}$ in a set ${A}$, it would suffice to understand the equidistribution of the quadruplet ${(1_A(n), 1_A(n+r), 1_A(n+2r), 1_A(n+3r))}$ in ${\{0,1\}^4}$ as ${n}$ and ${r}$ vary. This is the starting point for the fundamental connection between combinatorics (and more specifically, the task of finding patterns inside sets) and dynamics (and more specifically, the theory of equidistribution and recurrence in measure-preserving dynamical systems, which is a subfield of ergodic theory). This connection was explored in one of my previous classes; it will also be important in this course (particularly as a source of motivation), but the primary focus will be on finitary, and Fourier-based, methods.

The theory of equidistribution of polynomial orbits was developed in the linear case by Dirichlet and Kronecker, and in the polynomial case by Weyl. There are two regimes of interest; the (qualitative) asymptotic regime in which the scale parameter ${N}$ is sent to infinity, and the (quantitative) single-scale regime in which ${N}$ is kept fixed (but large). Traditionally, it is the asymptotic regime which is studied, which connects the subject to other asymptotic fields of mathematics, such as dynamical systems and ergodic theory. However, for many applications (such as the study of the primes), it is the single-scale regime which is of greater importance. The two regimes are not directly equivalent, but are closely related: the single-scale theory can be usually used to derive analogous results in the asymptotic regime, and conversely the arguments in the asymptotic regime can serve as a simplified model to show the way to proceed in the single-scale regime. The analogy between the two can be made tighter by introducing the (qualitative) ultralimit regime, which is formally equivalent to the single-scale regime (except for the fact that explicitly quantitative bounds are abandoned in the ultralimit), but resembles the asymptotic regime quite closely.

We will view the equidistribution theory of polynomial orbits as a special case of Ratner’s theorem, which we will study in more generality later in this course.

For the finitary portion of the course, we will be using asymptotic notation: ${X \ll Y}$, ${Y \gg X}$, or ${X = O(Y)}$ denotes the bound ${|X| \leq CY}$ for some absolute constant ${C}$, and if we need ${C}$ to depend on additional parameters then we will indicate this by subscripts, e.g. ${X \ll_d Y}$ means that ${|X| \leq C_d Y}$ for some ${C_d}$ depending only on ${d}$. In the ultralimit theory we will use an analogue of asymptotic notation, which we will review later in these notes.

I have blogged a number of times in the past about the relationship between finitary (or “hard”, or “quantitative”) analysis, and infinitary (or “soft”, or “qualitative”) analysis. One way to connect the two types of analysis is via compactness arguments (and more specifically, contradiction and compactness arguments); such arguments can convert qualitative properties (such as continuity) to quantitative properties (such as bounded), basically because of the fundamental fact that continuous functions on a compact space are bounded (or the closely related fact that sequentially continuous functions on a sequentially compact space are bounded).

A key stage in any such compactness argument is the following: one has a sequence ${X_n}$ of “quantitative” or “finitary” objects or spaces, and one has to somehow end up with a “qualitative” or “infinitary” limit object ${X}$ or limit space. One common way to achieve this is to embed everything inside some universal space and then use some weak compactness property of that space, such as the Banach-Alaoglu theorem (or its sequential counterpart). This is for instance the idea behind the Furstenberg correspondence principle relating ergodic theory to combinatorics; see for instance this post of mine on this topic.

However, there is a slightly different approach, which I will call ultralimit analysis, which proceeds via the machinery of ultrafilters and ultraproducts; typically, the limit objects ${X}$ one constructs are now the ultraproducts (or ultralimits) of the original objects ${X_\alpha}$. There are two main facts that make ultralimit analysis powerful. The first is that one can take ultralimits of arbitrary sequences of objects, as opposed to more traditional tools such as metric completions, which only allow one to take limits of Cauchy sequences of objects. The second fact is Los’s theorem, which tells us that ${X}$ is an elementary limit of the ${X_\alpha}$ (i.e. every sentence in first-order logic which is true for the ${X_\alpha}$ for ${\alpha}$ large enough, is true for ${X}$). This existence of elementary limits is a manifestation of the compactness theorem in logic; see this earlier blog post for more discussion. So we see that compactness methods and ultrafilter methods are closely intertwined. (See also my earlier class notes for a related connection between ultrafilters and compactness.)

Ultralimit analysis is very closely related to nonstandard analysis. I already discussed some aspects of this relationship in an earlier post, and will expand upon it at the bottom of this post. Roughly speaking, the relationship between ultralimit analysis and nonstandard analysis is analogous to the relationship between measure theory and probability theory.

To illustrate how ultralimit analysis is actually used in practice, I will show later in this post how to take a qualitative infinitary theory – in this case, basic algebraic geometry – and apply ultralimit analysis to then deduce a quantitative version of this theory, in which the complexity of the various algebraic sets and varieties that appear as outputs are controlled uniformly by the complexity of the inputs. The point of this exercise is to show how ultralimit analysis allows for a relatively painless conversion back and forth between the quantitative and qualitative worlds, though in some cases the quantitative translation of a qualitative result (or vice versa) may be somewhat unexpected. In an upcoming paper of myself, Ben Green, and Emmanuel Breuillard (announced in the previous blog post), we will rely on ultralimit analysis to reduce the messiness of various quantitative arguments by replacing them with a qualitative setting in which the theory becomes significantly cleaner.

For sake of completeness, I also redo some earlier instances of the correspondence principle via ultralimit analysis, namely the deduction of the quantitative Gromov theorem from the qualitative one, and of Szemerédi’s theorem from the Furstenberg recurrence theorem, to illustrate how close the two techniques are to each other.